Versenkt und Vergessen

Atommüll vor Europas Küsten

ONR's Technical Advisory Panel on Aircraft Crash NOT to study Aircraft Crash  Terms of Reference for ONR's aircraft crash TAP will not incude for NPP containment damage severity and radiological consequences of potential release scenarios 

Information Commissioner's Office finds against ONR on EIR Claims Relating to aircraft crash on a NPP, the ICO Decision Notice FER0377581 concluded that although the ONR was correct in withholding the requested information, the time taken do so, over 13 months compared to the statutory period of 20 working days, was excessive.


Pre-Tsunami Seismic Damage at Unit 2 Fukushima  Analysis shows Unit 2 exceeded seismic design limit and methodology flawed - potential impact on NPP resilience Worldwide.   

EU Recommended Outcome of Stress Test Results on French NPPs   The French nuclear safety regulator, ASN, instructed L’Institut de Radioprotection et de Sûreté Nucléaire (IRSN) to independently evaluate the operator’s CSA programme. IRSN identified that, in addition to the current nuclear safety provisions, a new concept of a hardened safety core of structures, systems and components (SSCs) should be put in place.  This review identifies compelling reasons why 37 of France's 58 operating NPPs should cease operation. 

Glossary for the Layman's Guide to AWE Off-Site Emergency Planning   The fundamentals of West Berkshire's off-site REPPIR plan explained in layman's terms. 

La Vulnérabilite des Centrales Nucléaires Françaises aux Chutes d'Avion  Version française

IAEA Mission to Fukushima Daiichi fails to identify cause of 2011 catastrophe  The IAEA Mission Team failed to shed any further light whatsoever on the events and circumstances that culminated in the catastrophic failure and radiation release from three operational nuclear power plants, and for the explosion and radioactive release from the spent fuel pond of a fourth but defueled nuclear
reactor.  

Fukushima Daiichi Cold-Vent option poorly thought through Review of TEPCO's plan to flood the primary containment of Unit 1 creates more problems than it is intended to solve.